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‘Experimental Union’ and Baltic Sea cooperation: the




In the past, Baltic Sea cooperation has been characterized by a plethora of actors, embracing a wide range of
policy objectives, such as the establishment of a good environmental status for the regional sea. In 2009, the
European Council endorsed the European Union’s (EU) Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) as a new
tool in the repertoire of Cohesion Policy and European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). The EUSBSR seeks to
foster cross-sectoral coordination and functional cooperation in policy areas of ‘macro-region-level’
relevance, such as transport infrastructure, economic development and environmental protection – thus
projecting a ‘soft space’ of transnational Baltic Sea cooperation. Although ﬁrmly placed under the so-
called ‘Three No’s’, that is, the requirement of no additional EU funding, institutions and legislation, a
lean governance architecture at the macro-regional level has emerged over time and the strategy
mobilizes actors from all tenets of the EU’s multilevel governance system, including the EU itself, its
member and adjacent partner states, as well as subnational authorities and civil society. Drawing on the
lens of experimentalist governance, this paper analyzes the underlying mechanisms that allow it to be
gauged to what extent the Baltic Sea ‘soft space’ has solidiﬁed over the past decade. It also shows that
the EUSBSR effectively rebalances EU transnational and intergovernmental regional cooperation in the
Baltic macro-region.
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INTRODUCTION
Regional cooperation amongst countries surrounding the Baltic Sea has always been character-
ized by a high number of actors stretching across various levels of governance and different policy
sectors. It has been estimated that there are no fewer than 40 pan-Baltic organizations, such as
the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Helsinki
Commission (HELCOM) and others, and more than 600 organizations which promote some
regional cause (Schymik, 2012, p. 71) – turning the European Union’s (EU) (almost) common
sea into a veritable ‘sea of acronyms’ (Löwendahl & Pursianen, 2009, p. 614). The policy scope as
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well as institutional depth of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region has grown substantially in the
aftermath of the East–West conﬂict. While some political observers, however, dismiss regional
cooperation in this part of Europe as ‘unstructured and “messy”’ (Herolf, 2010, p. 25), others per-
ceive it in more positive terms (Gänzle, 2017a).1 Several organizations were already established
during the Cold War, such as HELCOM, which was founded in 1974 with a view to protecting
the maritime environment and because of the Soviet Union’s attempt to push for recognition of
the German Democratic Republic as a signatory to the convention; however, most regional
organizations only started to mushroom after the collapse of Communist rule in Central and
Eastern Europe (Cottey, 1999; Schymik, 2012, pp. 69ff.). Most notably, the CBSS emerged
as the pivotal ‘regional undertaking to promote new ideas for cooperation’ (CBSS, 1992, p. 1)
amongst the 11 Baltic Sea states (Etzold, 2010);2 the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation
(BSSSC) and the UBC, in turn, sought to foster sub-national and municipal cooperation (Mälly,
2018). Taking aside the ongoing crisis with Russia because of Ukraine, which does not only affect
the EU at large, but also the countries of the Baltic Sea Region (Brask, 2014), regional
cooperation still seems to be prospering.
In addition to intergovernmental regional cooperation, the EU has a track record of func-
tional collaboration in the framework of territorial and cross-border cooperation (Gänzle,
2016). It is today widely accepted that European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) constitutes
one of the cornerstones of European integration (Knippenberg, 2004; Perkmann, 2003). EU
macro-regional strategies are the most recent addition to this toolbox of functional cooperation
in a territorial context (Dühr, 2011, 2018; Gänzle & Kern, 2016a, 2016b; Metzger & Schmitt,
2012; Schuh et al., 2015; Sielker, 2016; Stead, 2011, 2014a, 2014b). Although geographically
focused on a ‘macro-region’, such as the Baltic Sea, these strategies have been devised to address
speciﬁc challenges and opportunities, and to promote mutual learning processes through
‘experimenting’ (Gänzle, 2017b; Gänzle & Mirtl, 2017a, 2017b) with new governance archi-
tectures. The EUSBSR is not only the ﬁrst and oldest, but admittedly also the most advanced
EU ‘macro-regional project’ to date (see the contributions to Gänzle & Kern, 2016a). Compris-
ing Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,3 Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, it is pri-
marily conceived as an EU internal strategy. ‘Partner’ countries of regional cooperation in
the Baltic Sea, such as Iceland and Norway, but also the Russian Federation, have remained
loosely ‘associated’ via the frame of the Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and the Northern
Dimension (ND) (Bengtsson, 2009; Makarychev & Sergunin, 2017; Salines, 2010). The
EU’s inward-looking focus of the EUSBSR – furthered by the bilateral sanction regime
between the EU and Russia as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis – stands in stark contrast
to the three other EU macro-regional strategies that have hitherto been adopted by the Euro-
pean Council. That is, the EU Strategies for the Danube (2011), Adriatic–Ionian (2014) and
Alpine Region (2015) all exhibit a relatively clear external dimension, involving countries such
as Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Moldova and Ukraine ‘on a
par’ in the macro-regional governance architecture (see the contributions to Dühr, 2011;
2018; Gänzle & Kern, 2016a; Plangger, 2018).
According to the European Commission, a ‘macro-region’ is ‘an area including territory
from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common fea-
tures or challenges’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 1, original emphasis). Macro-regions are
certainly purposefully construed, albeit in the case of the Baltic Sea, the idea of region-ness –
deﬁned as ‘the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an
active subject, capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region’ (Hettne
& Söderbaum, 2000, p. 461) – is possibly most advanced given the well-established trajectory of
regional and territorial cooperation in the wider Baltic and Nordic areas. In terms of their ‘stra-
tegic’ focus, EU macro-regional strategies involve a deliberative process by which a set of objec-
tives and measures is determined to address challenges and opportunities of a macro-region; thus,
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they become ‘long-term political initiatives … on cross-cutting policy issues locked in commit-
ments about targets and processes’ (Borrás & Radaelli, 2011, p. 464) lacking an ‘expiry date’ and
thus decoupled from speciﬁc constraints set by the EU’s timeline for multi-annual budgets.
By proposing macro-regional strategies, the EU aims to establish an:
integrated framework to address common challenges, i.e. the urgent environmental challenges related to
the Baltic Sea, and to contribute to the economic success of the region and to its social and territorial cohe-
sion, as well as to the competitiveness of the EU. (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 11)
This may be supported by existing ﬁnancial means from the European Structural and Invest-
ment Funds (ESIF). The core aim of these strategies is to deﬁne and drive coordination and
integration of different policy sectors, such as environment and agriculture, in a comprehen-
sive way. This goal, however, has been made subject to the principle of the so-called ‘Three
No’s’, which means that the implementation of macro-regional strategies (1) should not result
in any (major) additional costs, for example, in terms of funding via EU Cohesion Policy; (2)
should not trigger the establishment of any new institutions; and ﬁnally (3) should not give
rise to speciﬁc EU legislation devised for the ‘macro-region’ (European Commission, 2009,
p. 5; Schymik, 2011, pp. 5–6). The lack of ﬁnancial sources was due to the ﬁrst macro-
regional strategy having been endorsed at a time when the EU budget was already in oper-
ation for the 2007–13 ﬁnancial perspective, and therefore did not allow the inclusion of new
budget lines – a principle that has been subsequently maintained. Thus, the creators of this
new approach hoped to avoid competition for ﬁnancial resources and rather aspired to use the
‘Three No’s’ as a test-bed for new formats of governing transnational cooperation in line with
intergovernmental forms of collaboration. Towards this background the present paper seeks,
ﬁrst, to contribute to furthering the conceptualization of EU macro-regional strategies;
second, to answer whether the EUSBSR can be grasped as an instance of experimentalist
governance; and, if so, third, unpack the dynamics of macro-regional experimentalist
governance.
In methodological terms, this paper pursues a threefold approach. First, it draws from docu-
ment analysis and the critical reading of a growing body of literature dealing with the topic.
Second, the author has conducted a number of semi-structured and informal experts’ interviews
(2011–18) since the start of the ‘macro-regional project’. Most of the anonymous interviews have
been transcribed – or been summarized in those cases where interviewees did not grant per-
mission for recording. The interviews include actors from the EUSBSR governance architecture,
such as policy coordinators, national coordinators (NCs) and representatives from intergovern-
mental regional organization and organizations of the ETC (see Table 1). Third, the paper
also beneﬁts from the author’s participatory observation at the occasion of attending several
EUSBSR-related meetings and events such as the EUSBSR annual fora (in Copenhagen, Berlin,
Stockholm, Riga and Tallinn).
This contribution proceeds as follows. First, it introduces the experimentalist governance
approach (Gänzle, 2017b; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, 2010, 2012; Zeitlin, 2015) as an analytical
tool for assessing the dynamics of the EUSBSR embedding it in the ongoing debates on soft
spaces, reterritorialization and multilevel governance in Europe. Second, it reviews the emer-
gence of regional cooperation in particular in light of the emerging EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region (EUSBSR). Third, it analyzes the governance architecture in light of the prop-
ositions – the joint framework development, the empowerment of lower level units to implement,
reporting and periodic and recursive feedback – of the experimentalist governance. Finally, it
addresses the core achievements and shortcomings from the strategy, drawing several conclusions
for future research.
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SOFT SPACES, RETERRITORIALIZATION AND EXPERIMENTALIST
GOVERNANCE
Scholars from the ﬁelds of geography, regional and spatial planning have interpreted macro-
regional strategies as an innovative approach to European policy-making (e.g., Dühr, 2018;
Faludi, 2012; Sielker, 2016) leading to different forms of cooperation with involvement of a
wide range of stakeholders from different sectors and levels of governance. More speciﬁcally,
the notion of macro-regional strategies as ‘soft spaces’ of governance has gained currency
among scholars. The idea was originally forged to reﬂect on the emergence of numerous entirely
new planning scales in the form of ‘soft spaces’ characterized by ‘fuzzy boundaries’, consisting of
non-statutory ‘spatialities of planning’ with associations and relations cutting across both formally
established boundaries and scalar levels of planning and previously entrenched sectoral divides.
Subsequently, the concept has been applied to EU macro-regional strategies (e.g., Faludi,
2010; Stead, 2011, 2014a, 2014b). Informality, variability and ﬂexibility of the institutional
structures, different thematic and stakeholders’ involvement are deﬁning characteristics of
these soft spaces (Allmendinger, Chilla, & Sielker, 2014). Key questions are how new spatial
references impact on political bargaining and negotiations and whether the non-statutory
arrangements in macro-regions will eventually lead to a solidiﬁcation, if not ‘hardening’ (or for-
malization) of these ‘soft’ arrangements (e.g., Allmendinger et al., 2014; Faludi, 2012; Hincks,
Deas, & Haughton, 2017; Metzger & Schmitt, 2012). Consequently, one may speculate if
macro-regional strategies ultimately imply a process of reterritorialization and the redeﬁnition
of borders, possibly underwritten by general trends of differentiated integration in the European
Union.
The overlaps between the academic debates in geography, regional planning and political
science are considerable as they put into question ‘the character of relations between different
actors, levels and territories and the way administrations, political and private stakeholders
seek to identify appropriate governance arrangements’ (Gänzle, Stead, Sielker, & Chilla, 2018,
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1478929918781982). Whereas classical theories of
regional integration – such as neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism – have been
interested in disclosing the main driving forces of integration (Piattoni, 2016), governance
approaches are interested in procedural aspects and effects of regional integration on member
states and regions. Since the 1990s, governance approaches, such as multilevel, network and
external governance, have come to the fore of the research agenda in political science, public
administration and European studies (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006).
Whereas multilevel governance presumably sticks out as the most popular and prominent gov-
ernance approach (e.g., Hooghe &Marks, 2003; Marks, 1992, 1993; for a criticism of the multi-
level governance concept for its ambiguity, see Faludi, 2012), the concept of experimentalist
governance has been developed as an explanatory tool for European integration under conditions
of crisis, sustained uncertainty and change (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, 2010, 2012). Sabel and Zeitlin
have described experimentalist governance as ‘a recursive process of provisional goal-setting and
revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them in
different contexts’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 1). From this assumption, the experimentalist gov-
ernance approach analytically distinguishes four phases of the recursive process as follows:
[F]irst, framework goals (such as ‘good water status’, safe food, non-discrimination, and a uniﬁed energy
grid) and measures for gauging their achievement are established by joint action of theMember States and
EU institutions. Lower-level units (such as national ministries or regulatory authorities and the actors
with whom they collaborate) are, second, given the freedom to advance these ends as they see ﬁt. …
[I]n return for this autonomy, they must, third, report regularly on performance, especially as measured
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by the agreed indicators, and participate in a peer review in which their own results are compared with
those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Fourth and ﬁnally, the framework goals, metrics,
and procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors who initially established them … . (p. 3)
‘Experimentalist governance’ is much more concerned about procedural aspects than policy out-
comes. Moreover, experimentalist governance in the EU is not exclusively conﬁned to those pol-
icy ﬁelds where the EU has weak competences, for example, when issuing mainly non-binding
guidelines, action plans, scoreboards and recommendations. In many cases, the experimentalist
architecture may trigger revisions of EU law, or the elaboration of revisable standards mandated
by law and principles that may eventually be given binding force. While a uniform pattern of
experimentalist governance does not exist, experimentalist governance can even trigger ‘a reversal
to classic modes of governance’ (Mendez, 2011, p. 521), which implies the solidiﬁcation or hard-
ening of previously soft spaces.
This has important consequences for EU macro-regional strategies. Although they started
under the constraint of the ‘Three No’s’, it cannot be excluded to see the emergence of new insti-
tutions, new funding logics and sources, and – possibly – legal arrangements. Thus, we treat the
EUSBSR as an instance of experimentalist governance and a challenge to the (more formal) ter-
ritorial cooperation of the EU’s regional policy. Owing to the vagueness concerning implemen-
tation tools and power dispersed across the EU’s interdependent multilevel system of governance
in general, and the consensual approach characterizing EU regional policy, the EU’s macro-
regional strategies constitute paradigmatic examples of experimentalist governance, such as, for
example, the so-called ‘Turku process’ (Jetoo, 2018), an initiative of the twin cities of Turku,
Hamburg and St Petersburg to promote municipal cooperation and ‘to increase the number of
Northwest Russian partners in the Baltic Sea region cooperation’ (Centrum Balticum, 2018).
Ultimately, their signiﬁcance resides in their capacity to mobilize institutional and non-insti-
tutional actors towards central EU policy goals, and their capacity to recombine the institutional
structures of the EU’s multilevel governance system in order to conduct and implement policies
‘in novel but ﬂuid ways’ (Plangger, 2018, quoted in Gänzle et al. (2018), p. 6).
THE PATH TOWARDS THE EUSBSR
Taking the long trajectory of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area into account, it does not
come as a surprise that the ﬁrst of the EU’s set of macro-regional strategies was devised for this
region (Rostoks, 2010). After EU enlargement in 2004, the Baltic Sea became almost entirely
part of EU territory, rendering the future of hitherto established formats of regional integration –
e.g., in the frame of the CBSS (Etzold, 2010; Lundin, 2013) – uncertain with regards to future
purposes and directions.
Historically, regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area has left traces in the collective mem-
ory of its inhabitants ever since the Hanse, an alliance of several Baltic cities to protect and defend
commercial interests during theMiddle Ages, contributed to the formation of ‘region-ness’ in the
area. Drawing on cultural proximity, this triggered sensitivity for regional collaboration in the
aftermath of the Second World War, which ﬁrst resulted in Nordic cooperation (Denmark, Ice-
land, Norway, Sweden and – later – Finland) along a wide range of policy areas, including the
formation of a passport union. Second, it informed the signing of the Helsinki Convention
and the subsequent establishment of the so-called Helsinki Commission4 as its body for steering
intergovernmental cooperation with a view to protect the fragile marine environment of the Bal-
tic Sea from all sources of pollution. The Helsinki Commission was one of the few examples of
regime formation across the ideological blocs during the East–West conﬂict. Third, Baltic Sea
cooperation was eventually the ﬁrst sub-regional cooperative arrangement, mushrooming along
the borders of the former East–West dividing lines, for instance, the Visegrád and Black Sea
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cooperation (Cottey, 1999; Dangerﬁeld, 2016). However, in contrast to the latter formats, the
Baltic Sea cooperation – as institutionalized in the CBSS in March 1992 – brought the partici-
pating countries from both sides of the former Iron Curtain to the discussion table; although
strictly speaking several of the Nordic countries – i.e., Finland and Sweden – have remained
non-aligned. The growth of cooperation at the national level amongst the states off the shores
of the Baltic Sea almost immediately translated into efforts improving the participation of
both municipalities and other sub-national authorities in the region. Consequently, the Union
of Baltic Cities and the Baltic Sea State Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC) were formed in
1993. Fourth, the prospect of EU integration – ﬁrst with the admission of Finland and Sweden
in 1995, and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in 2004 – not only pushed the EU to become
a key regional actor, but also turned almost the entire Baltic Sea into a common sea of the EU –
with the sole exception of the Russian Federation. To accommodate the speciﬁc needs of the
region, the EU sought to coordinate better its own instruments and policies for regional
cooperation such as through the ND, endorsed in 1999 and renewed in 2006, which focuses
on economic development, environmental protection, public health and transport (Archer &
Etzold, 2008; Catellani, 2000).
In the wake of EU enlargement, many policy-makers of the Baltic Sea Region eventually felt
the urgent need to improve coordination amongst the plethora of institutions that had started to
populate regional collaboration over the past few years, and to integrate better the EU member
states participating in Baltic Sea cooperation (Aalto, Espíritu, Kilpeläinen, & Lanko, 2016;
Hubel, 2004). To achieve these goals, the ND was morphed into a common policy beyond
the EU to include Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. The CBSS, in turn, was trans-
formed into a more project-orientated body, stripping off its post-Cold War features primarily
geared towards ensuring a smooth return of the newly independent Baltic States on the diplo-
matic ﬂoor. Concomitantly, after the ﬁrst post-enlargement European Parliament elections, a
Euro-Baltic Intergroup was established in 2004 bringing together members of the European Par-
liament from various Baltic Sea Region countries, such as Alexander Stubb and Hendrik Ilves. In
2005, the group presented an initiative to the European Commission president with the idea to
maximize the economic potential of the reunited Baltic Sea Region (Beazley, 2007, p. 14), and to
lobby for a more consolidated EU pillar of Baltic Sea states within the ND. Following a mandate
by the European Council, the European Commission subsequently adopted the initiative and
started to develop a joint framework.
EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE AND THE EUSBSR
EU macro-regional strategies, such as the EUSBSR, constitute ﬁrst and foremost broad frame-
works and joint endeavours decided among authorities at different territorial levels of government
(supranational, national and subnational) which tend to institutionalize some consultation pat-
terns, decision-making procedures, administrative roles and behavioural expectations over
time, despite the so-called ‘Three No’s’. Second, macro-regional strategies provide public and
private actors with the opportunity to mobilize the defence of their own interests and to forge
policies, as well as alliances and institutions that will accommodate them. In this process, actors
at the ‘lower’, that is, national or subnational, levels are given some discretion in terms of
implementation. Third, the main drive of macro-regional strategies is to encourage the
implementation of a set of interconnected policies, which were originally pursued separately in
response to distinct societal pressures, and to commit the member states to report regularly on
process and result – thus encouraging ‘diagnostic monitoring’ (Sabel, 2016). Fourth, based on
these experiences and feedback, the framework is regularly revised and adjusted, before the
cycle then repeats itself. Hence, one would expect some sustained forms of navel-gazing and
evaluation-based revision of policy tools serving the implementation of macro-regional strategies.
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Developing a joint framework for the EU’s Baltic Sea strategy
Once the European Commission had taken the initiative from the European Parliament, it
sought to include a wide range of stakeholders during the preparation of both the strategy and
its accompanying action plan. To this end, a public consultation process was organized that
occurred between August 2008 and February 2009 (Bengtsson, 2009, p. 3; Rostoks, 2010, pp.
15ff.). During that time, several hundred position papers and statements were prepared, issued
from various corners encompassing different private and public actors from virtually all levels
of Baltic Sea cooperation. After a synthesizing analysis of the publicly available documents, Schy-
mik and Krumrey (2009, p. 15) concluded that ‘[t]he European Commission has by and large
been able to draft an Action Plan that captures the essence of public opinion in the region’. Even-
tually, the EUSBSR was presented by the European Commission in June 2009 and adopted by
the European Council in October that year under the Council Presidency of Sweden. Sweden
had turned the EUSBSR into a top priority and ensured support among the targeted EUmember
states. Whereas the macro-regional strategy constitutes a broad and comprehensive framework,
the action plan identiﬁes ‘the concrete priorities for the macro-region’. The action plan proposed
the establishment of four pillars for macro-regional cooperation with the aim (1) to improve the
environmental state of the Baltic Sea; (2) to promote more balanced economic development in
the region; (3) to make the sea more accessible and attractive; and (4) to increase macro-regional
safety and security. Once included in the action plan, the action or project ‘should be
implemented by the countries and stakeholders concerned… [and] be illustrative, providing
examples of types of projects or approaches to be more generally encouraged’ (p. 3, added emphasis).
Whereas the macro-regional strategy itself constitutes the broad and comprehensive framework,
the action plan identiﬁes ‘the concrete priorities for the macro-region’ (p. 3) and is being renewed
regularly.
In the ﬁrst major review report published in June 2011, the European Commission stressed
that the EUSBSR’s overall impact had been successful, emphasizing that, in particular, it ‘has led
to concrete action, with a more streamlined use of resources… [where] [n]ew working methods
and networks have been established, and many initiatives developed’ (European Commission,
2011, p. 3). Clearly, as the EUSBSR was launched in the middle of the 2007–13 programming
period, a great deal of ﬁnancial resources had already been reserved for other projects. Neverthe-
less, a number of new projects began, such as the ‘Baltic Deal’, which make strong references to
the strategy. Members of the Baltic Deal network would work ‘with farmers across the region to
reduce nutrient run-off, and therefore eutrophication’ (p. 2), which is one, if not the key, chal-
lenge of the Baltic Sea. This project has often been used as a reference point to showcase
enhanced awareness across different policy sectors and communities in the region. In 2013,
the European Commission engaged in an evaluation exercise that included an extensive survey
of more than 100 key stakeholders, as well as independent assessments by external experts.
The evaluation concluded that macro-regional strategies have triggered clear results, ‘evident
in terms of projects and more integrated policy making, although further improvements are
essential in implementation and planning’ (European Commission, 2013a, p. 11). At the
same time, the document also identiﬁes a set of problems, such as the lack of leadership in
some corners of the macro-region. While the scarcity of administrative capacities and national
resources may account for political disinterest in some countries, the complexities of the
EUSBSR’s governance architecture have not helped to make either its EUmember states or part-
ner countries wholeheartedly hail the new initiative.
Entrusting lower-level units in Baltic Sea EU member states with autonomy
Despite the ‘Three No’s’, the adoption of the EUSBSR was accompanied by the emergence of a
lean governance architecture comprising a wide range of actors from the EU’s system of
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multilevel governance. In this region, the member states assume a paramount role and are con-
stantly compelled to assume political leadership of the ‘macro-regional project’. In general, the
success of the strategies is dependent on the political willingness, as well as the administrative
and ﬁnancial capacities of participating states. EU member states collaborate in the network of
national contact points (NCPs), or NCs, which have – over time – become the cornerstone of
macro-regional strategies, assisting and coordinating their implementation at the national
level. Participating states are linked to policy formulation by the so-called High-Level Group
(HLG), which also brings together all other member states at the EU level. EU member states
that are not part of a given macro-region, however, ‘do not actively participate in the HLGmeet-
ings’ (interview 1). (For interviews, see Table 1.) The European Commission, in turn, assumes
overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of both the strategy and its accompany-
ing action plan. Together with EU member states in the Baltic Sea Region, it has become the
driving force behind the policy process leading towards the strategy’s successful implementation.
It assumes an important role in preparing strategy reviews, as well as in monitoring its implemen-
tation and leading the overall coordination of the rolling action plan. Policy area coordinators
(PACs) or horizontal action leaders (HALs) – later called policy or horizontal actions coordina-
tors – from different member states and organizations coordinate each priority area (PA). Differ-
ent member states or organizations are responsible for the PAs and horizontal action(s) (HA).
Further, several organizations operating at the macro-regional level – e.g., the CBSS, HEL-
COM and Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea (VASAB) – actively participate in the
implementation of the strategy as either PACs, such as the CBSS for PA ‘Secure’, or HALs
such as VASAB and HELCOM for HA ‘Spatial Planning’. As one policy coordinator put it:
‘[w]orking in the capacity of PAC/HAL implies having to tackle a great deal of complexity.
Besides, it often takes place in environments characterized by uncertainty (e.g., of mandates,
agendas, possibilities) and ambiguity (e.g., unclear roles, poor information)’ (Bergström, 2013,
p. 2). With a view to assisting policy coordinators with their coordinating tasks and functions,
steering groups have also been established. These groups bring together a number of representa-
tives from various organizations and line ministries in order to consult the PACs who themselves
work in cooperation with the European Commission, relevant EU agencies and national/regional
bodies. Subsequently, policy coordinators are compelled to identify – together with the steering
group members – ‘macro-regional models’ of ﬂagship projects for funding by combing existing
and available European and national sources. Over time, steering groups ‘have become more cen-
tral in the EUSBSR’ (interview 2) as they provide an opportunity for sectoral coordination
amongst administrators across the all participating countries.
Ensuring regular reporting
Monitoring and reporting has developed into a yardstick of EU macro-regional strategies. In
2015, the Council decided that the European Commission was to evaluate all macro-regional
strategies in a comprehensive way every other year. Thus, this aimed to avoid fragmentation,
as well as ‘to make it possible to compare MRS [macro-regional strategies] and will provide
all institutions concerned with sufﬁcient insights for an informed debate’ (European Commis-
sion, 2016, p. 3). The reports themselves, of which the ﬁrst was published in 2016, are based
on contributions from the macro-regional strategies’ stakeholders, European institutions, mem-
ber state representatives, academia and experts. Interestingly, the presentation tools – e.g., the
Table 1. Interviews
Interview 1: Horizontal Area Leader, Stockholm, June 30, 2013
Interview 2: Interact ofﬁcial, Tallinn, June 4, 2018
Interview 3: Representative of the Council of Danube Cities and Regions, January 22, 2013
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website of macro-regional strategies such as the EUSBSR and EU Strategy for the Danube
Region (EUSDR) – have converged with a view to strengthening the horizontal dimension of
comparability between the macro-regional strategies. Furthermore, policy coordinators and hori-
zontal action coordinators are compelled to report on a yearly basis to the European Commission
on the implementation progress regarding the objectives and projects which have been agreed
upon on the EUSBSR in 2012. As noted:
There is increasing demand, not least from the Commission, for a stronger focus on the strategies’ core
priorities. In this regard, it is important to align the MRS with broader strategies for EU policy-making
and to ensure regular reviews towards identiﬁed objectives, as this increases chances of delivering results.
Without clearly deﬁned indicators and targets, is difﬁcult to assess how well the planned objectives have
been met. A sound monitoring system based on results-oriented action is crucial to make it possible to
measure, steer and report on each MRS to inform decision making. (European Commission, 2016, p. 4)
With regards to its target-informed approach, the EUSBSR occupies a unique place amongst all
macro-regional strategies. Still, it has remained difﬁcult to assess the precise impact of the
EUSBSR on speciﬁc policy developments in the region, such as eutrophication (EU Court of
Auditors, 2016).
Providing feedback-loops to inform the governance architecture of the EU’s
Baltic Sea strategy
The EUSBSR Action Plan was conceived as ‘rolling’, which fundamentally implied that it would
quickly absorb ‘lessons learned’ and engage in a recursive process of experimentalist governance.
Therefore, it was revised in 2010, 2013 (European Commission, 2013c) and 2015 (European
Commission, 2015) respectively. As shown, the EUSBSR action plan had originally proposed
the establishment of four pillars for macro-regional cooperation along the lines of the four chal-
lenges identiﬁed for the macro-region. These areas have subsequently been turned into 15 differ-
ent so-called PAs that have been assigned a set of highly relevant projects (also known as ﬂagship
projects) as the showcase for the EUSBSR. The original four overall strategy pillars have been
streamlined and transferred into just three objectives: (1) to save the sea; (2) to connect the
region; and (3) to increase prosperity. Concomitantly, however, the number of PAs was increased
from 15 to 17, which at the time raised doubts amongst some observers ‘whether the Strategy will
in practice become more focused and more effective’ (Etzold, 2013, p. 11). The HAs (cross-cut-
ting themes such as ‘Neighbours’ with the aim of integrating stakeholders in neighbouring
countries) have been reduced quite signiﬁcantly from 13 to ﬁve, and subsequently to four, now
including ‘Sustainability’, ‘Neighbours’, ‘Climate’ and ‘Capacity’.
Several of these HAs are managed by regional organizations such as the umbrella organiz-
ation for civil society Norden, the UBC and the CBSS. Whereas the CBSS did not occupy a
central role at the beginning at the launch of the EUSBSR, it was gradually recognized as an
important player in the revised action plan of February 2013 and June 2015 – when it started
to manage several macro-regional projects and contribute to the governance of the strategy.
Since then, the CBSS has, amongst other things, co-coordinated a PA focusing on civil contin-
gencies and two HAs, namely ‘Neighbours’ and ‘Sustainability’.
In addition, annual fora for the EUSBSR have strengthened stakeholder involvement and
participation, the ﬁrst of which was held in Tallinn in 2010, followed by Gdansk (2011), Copen-
hagen (2012), Vilnius (2013), Turku (2014), Jūrmela (2015), Stockholm (2016), Berlin (2017)
and Tallinn (2018). By bringing together both policy-makers and stakeholders, these meetings
provided a platform for networking, discussions and an exchange of views about the EUSBSR
and its implementation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The analysis clearly demonstrates that the EUSBSR is underpinned by a logic of experimentalist
governance. Despite the call for ‘no new institutions’, a lean governance architecture has been
established that strongly draws on existing institutions that have been integrated ‘into the texture’
of EUSBSR governance. The strategy-making and the implementation of strategy-related objec-
tives can be grasped as a sequence of recursive processes that subsequently allow for mutual learn-
ing of all participating actors and stakeholders. In this vein, the Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum, for
example, can be interpreted as representing a permanent change brought about by an EUSBSR
ﬂagship. It has been transformed into a permanent ﬁsheries forum that ‘is embedded into the
everyday cooperation work of the Ministries of the region’ (EUSBSR Policy Area Bioeconomy,
n.d.). Gradually, transnational institutions are redesigned and solidify, becoming constitutive
elements of macro-regions, which include hybrid arrangements of governmental and non-gov-
ernmental actors (Joas, Sanberg, & Kern, 2007). Combining the perspective of experimentalist
governance with the literature on soft spaces ultimately helps grasping the nature of softness
which is determined by the recursive process of governance. In other words, the soft space of
the Baltic Sea Region is hardening, although it remains to be seen how sustainable and desirable
these processes ultimately are.
Furthermore, and in contrast to previous EU attempts to reinforce regional cooperation, such
as the EU’s Approaches to the Baltic Sea Region of 1994 or the Northern Dimension of 1999
(Archer & Etzold, 2008; Catellani, 2000; Council of the European Union, 1999), the EU has
now begun to sketch out a framework that addresses common challenges and opportunities
not only in a more comprehensive manner but also in an EU-centred manner. It is perhaps in
this regard where the EUSBSR differs most from the other macro-regional strategies which
have more of an eternal focus, such as the EUSDR and EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian
Region (EUSAIR). Regional cooperation below the EU level has been characterized in the
past by a plethora of region-speciﬁc actors and arrangements, covering a wide range of objectives
and policies (Aalto et al., 2016). The EUSBSR, therefore, serves as a facilitator of coordination in
the Baltic Sea Region with signiﬁcant effects beyond its territorial boundaries. By applying the
label of macro-regional strategy, different macro-regional territories – such as the Alpine, Baltic
Sea or Danube macro-regional space – can be compared with each other in terms of their gov-
ernance architecture and overall ‘effectiveness’, thus allowing for some competition for best poss-
ible practice. As such, the ‘Baltic example’ has been accepted as a ‘model’ in other macro-regional
set-ups such as the EU Strategy of the Danube Region (interview 3).
This paper has shown that EU macro-regional strategies such as the EUSBSR aim at the
alignment of objectives and resources of both transnational with intergovernmental
cooperation. Macro-regional strategies after all support the implementation of EU-level strat-
egies – such as the ones expressed in Europe 2020 – as part of the ESIF on a macro-regional
scale (Roggeri, 2015). By this, EU macro-regional strategies ultimately aim to substantiate the
objective of territorial cohesion introduced by Article 174 of the Treaty of Lisbon with a view
to complement the principles of social and economic cohesion. Consequently, the European
Commission has emphasized the importance of this form of ‘regionalism’ inside the EU for
the entire European Union. Conceived ‘as building blocks in reaching European objectives’
(European Commission, 2013b, p. 20), macro-regions consequently become ‘integral aspect
[s] of the essence of the Union’ (Joenniemi, 2010, p. 33). By forging both a comprehensive
and integrated framework for the Baltic Sea Region, the EUSBSR ultimately aims to realign
complex politico-social, regulatory and ecosystem boundaries, framing itself as a legitimate
form of regionalization inside the EU – and thus contributing to the hardening of the soft
space of Baltic Sea cooperation.
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NOTES
1. For a fundamental critique vis-à-vis EU macro-regional strategies, see Bialasiewicz, Giac-
caria, Jones, and Minca (2013).
2. The CBSS members are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sweden as well as a member of the European External
Action Service (EEAS).
3. That is, the German Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and
Hamburg.
4. Today, the contracting parties are Denmark, Estonia, the European Union, Finland,
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. The Helsinki Commission is not to
be confused with the US Helsinki Commission (Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe), which is an independent US government agency created by Congress in 1975 to moni-
tor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) commitments.
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